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Regulating the Blue Crab, Callinectes sapidus, Fishery
Of Virginia: Biological and Economic Concerns
J.E. Kirkley, W.O. DuPaul, and M. Oesterling 1
resource managers be concerned with the high apparent
rate of fishing mortality, particularly given the
variability in stock size over time.3 How valid and
stable is the relationship between recruitment and
spawning stock biomass? What is the relationship
between water quality, abundance, current harvest
levels, fishing and natural mortality, and future
recruitment?

Introduction

The blue crab, Callinectes sapiclus, fishery has been
one of the most important fisheries of Virginia. The
importance of the fishery in terms of commercial
activities has substantially increased in recent years in
response to declining resource levels of American
Oyster, Crassostrea virginica, and a growing
international and domestic demand for soft crabs,
female hard crabs, and crab meat.

A major problem which must be considered in
evaluating the biological and economic importance and
management of the fishery is the biological and
economic interactions between the Maryland and
Virginia crab fisheries. What are the state relationships
and interactions between resource abundance and
availability,
reproductive
act1V1t1es,
harvests,
regulation, and recruitment patterns? How would the
fishery of one state be affected by various regulations
imposed by the other state?

The actual economic importance of the fishery,
however, is not well known. For example, what are the
employment and earning levels generated by the
fishery? What portion of a waterman's household
income is derived from crabbing? How much does
crabbing contribute to state tax revenues? How do
regulations affect the economies of coastal
communities, and what are the economic impacts on
processors, seafood dealers, restaurants, and providers
of fishing supplies and services? Answers to these
questions are necessary to manage the resource in the
best interests of Virginia.

Informed resource management requires answers to
the previously posed questions. There appears to be,
nevertheless, an urgent need to better manage and
regulate the resource and the fishery. In this brief
paper, we provide an overview of regulatory options for
managing and regulating the blue crab fishery. We
initially focus on open-access strategies and
subsequently present a discussion of regulations that
address the common-property, open-access, fishery.
Prior to discussing management options, we discuss
goals and objectives of resource management.

There are many other questions about the blue crab
fishery and resource that also must be answered. What
are the current and optimum levels of harvests, effort,
and fishing mortality? Volstad et al. (1994) suggest
that fishing mortality (F) was extremely high in 1993.2
Rothschild ct al. (1993) suggest that
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Maurer, B.Daugherty, G. Davis, C. Zhang, and R.
McGarvey. 1992. Assessment of the Chesapeake Bay
Blue Crab Stock. Univ. of MD. Chesapeake Bay
Biological Lab. DB92-003-036, CEES 07-4-30 307,
Solomons, Maryland.
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state could manage for maximum economic
opportu111t1es in terms of employment and earnings.
Alternatively, the
state could attempt to maximize the economic concept
of net benefits. Last, the state could simply try to
maximize production or landings of blue crabs.

Goals and Objectives of Resource Management
Management and regulation of the blue crab fishery
has primarily focused on resource conservation and
industry maintenance. That is, resource conservation is
of primary concern but conservation cannot be so
stringent that people become unemployed. Under this
strategy, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
(VMRC) has had to constantly balance and assess
trade-offs between the current and future well-being of
the industry and the resource. Under such a strategy,
biological and economic problems will nearly always
occur for the fishery in question. Simply, resource
abundance, age classes, biomass levels, economic
opportunities, and social benefits will be jeopardized if
management does not have clearly defined goals and
objectives that integrate the underlying population
dynamics and economic aspects of the fishery (i.e., a
bio-economic optimum).

There is, however, an agreement between Maryland
and Virginia which specifics the goal of managing blue
crabs as "to manage blue crabs in a way which
conserves and protects the ecological value of the stock,
and at the same time generates the greatest long term
economic and social benefits from the resource. "4
While there is a stated goal, it is vague and does not
specify an actual optimum yield (OY) for blue crabs.
What exactly does it mean to conserve the baywidc
stock, protect the ecological value of blue crabs, and
optimize the long-term use of the resource? Moreover,
if management is to generate the maximum long-term
economic and social benefits from the resource, VMRC
will have to initiate a substantial economic data
collection program. The state currently has mandatory
reporting but the program docs not collect information
on economic performance such as costs and earnings.
Without the necessary specification of OY and
economic information, the management and regulation
of the blue crab fishery will be difficult. Alternatively,
an arbitrary OY might be set equal to the long-term
average annual harvest. This would closely parallel the
objective of maintaining the industry. This OY,
however, creates the risk of resource problems. If the
empirical-based long-term yield is in error
(overestimate of maximum annual harvest) of the actual
long-term potential yield, it is possible to easily
overharvest the blue crab resource. The long-term yield
also completely ignores the social and economic
importance of the fishery.

There arc strong arguments being made to change the
management and regulatory policies for the blue crab
fishery. It is currently the opinion of VMRC and
research scientists that the blue crab resource is in
serious trouble. Between 1990 and 1992, reported
landings of blue crab plummeted by more than 50%,.
Over the last 50 years, however, blue crab landings
have exhibited regular periodicity or cyclic behavior in
which landings rapidly decline to very low levels.
Scientists arc concerned, though, that the resource may
not be simply following the normal cycle of ups and
downs.
Changing the management and regulatory policies
begs the question "What arc the goals and objectives of
blue crab management?" The goals and objectives of
managing any fishery in Virginia are given in General
Provision (28.2-203, p. 21) "Laws of Virginia Relating
to The Marine Resources of The Commonwealth." It
states "Conservation and management measures shall
prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum yield
from each fishery. The "optimum yield" of a fishery
means the amount of fish or shellfish which will
provide the greatest overall benefit to the
Commonwealth, with particular reference to
commercial fishing for food production and to
recreational fishing."

Even though the VMRC and the bi-state fishery
management plan (FMP) do not have well specified
objectives and a stated OY, it is, nevertheless, possible
to provide some general guidance on managing and
regulating the blue crab fishery. In particular, we can
examine several possible goals and objectives of
resource management in relation to various types of
fishery regulations.

Unfortunately, the state's concept of optimum yield
(OY) is quite vague. As stated in General Provision
28.2-203, numerous interpretations arc possible. The
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We first explore the option that the state might want to
rebuild or increase the resource as quickly as possible.
If this were the case, VMRC would only have to
impose an extremely restrictive limit on harvesting
activities until the resource obtained its desired level.
Extremely restrictive catch limits would, of course,
cause severe economic hardships for watermen, seafood
dealers, and processors.

would require the state to restrict catch or effort to
levels yielding the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
(Figure 2). Alternatively, the state would have to
maintain resource conditions at a given level such that
maximum sustainable yield could be realized. The
same rule would apply to the state attempting to
maintain any given level of resource.

Under the scenario of resource conservation first and
industry second, management could easily establish
regulatory policies (Figure 1 ): ( 1) when the resource
(X) is below the desired target level (X*), catch is
constrained to zero or nearly zero, and (2) if the
resource is above the desired target level, management
allows catch to equal the actual resource level minus
the target level.

Figure 2. Sustainable Yield Curve and MSY
MSY
catch •

MSY

MSY level
.-of fishing
effort

Figure 1. Blue Crab, Callinectes sapidus, Resource
Recovery Strategy, Minimize Time
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What exactly is maximum sustainable yield? MSY is
a long-run equilibrium concept; it is simply the
maximum harvest level that can be sustained over time.
Alternatively, MSY is the maximum possible average
annual harvest such that additions or growth to the
resource equals removals from the resource. If the
actual harvest exceeds MSY, it is often stated that the
resource is being overfished. If the harvest is less than
MSY, management may allow harvest levels to
increase.
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The third possibility--when resource abundance
equals the desired target lcvel--poses the most difficult
problem for VMRC. In theory, when actual stock
equals desired stock, the management agency should
set the harvest such that benefits to society arc
maximized. The state and the citizens of the
Commonwealth should derive the maximum possible
benefits from the resource.
Alternatively, the
objectives of management, whatever they are, should be
realized at minimum cost.

What is wrong with the objective of MSY? Extensive
research has shown that MSY is generally very
unstable. If MSY is the least bit overestimated,
depletion or even extinction of the resource stock is
possible. MSY is typically not really sustainable over
the long run; environmental conditions and other
factors cause substantial fluctuations in the resource
stock. In the case of the blue crab fishery or any short
lived marine species, environmental fluctuations are
likely to be extremely important factors contributing to
resource levels. Last, maximum sustainable yield, safe

What if the state had the objective of maximizing
sustainable yield or harvest levels? This objective
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The recreational harvest of blue crabs is not known.
It also is not known what portion of the recreational
harvest is commercially sold. Commercial and
recreational crabbers, however, have recently
complained about each other. Commercial crabbers
have indicated a concern that recreational crabbers are
catching too many crabs and/or possibly selling crabs.
Recreational crabbers have complained that the
commercial crabbers arc harvesting too much of the
resource. In addition, recreational boaters have
complained that crab pots arc interfering with
recreational boating. In the future, the state may have
to address the potential problems of user conllict among
recreational and commercial crabbers and recreational
boaters.

yield or harvest, maximum yield per recruit, and similar
regulatory targets are primarily biological objectives;
they ignore social and economic considerations of
renewable resource management.
Previous and current blue crab regulations suggest
that the state is quite concerned with the underlying
economics and not only with resource conservation. If
Virginia only wanted to pursue conservation, the state
could adopt policies consistent with those suggested in
Figure I or 2.
Unfortunately, the state does not have clearly
specified operational objectives. It is not possible,
therefore, to adequately determine the best management
and regulatory strategy for blue crabs unless certain
assumptions about the objectives of regulating the blue
crab fishery arc made. In the following discussion, we
assume the VMRC desires to restore the resource but is
concerned about the economic ramifications of various
regulatory options.

In contrast to the recreational fishery, there is
extensive information available on the commercial
fishery. Seven types of gear are used to exploit the
resource, but crab pots account for the majority of
reported catch (Table 1 ).
Table I. Virginia Blue Crab Landings, Gear Type

The Blue Crab Fishery:
Simple or Complex'?

Landings

The blue crab fishery is a single species fishery.
Resource issues under the purview of VMRC involve
the Chesapeake Bay, its tributaries, and the territorial
sea (ocean waters out to 3 miles). That is, the resource
management area is relatively small and localized in
comparison to the large offshore fisheries. The two
primary sources of landings and fishing mortality arc
commercial watermen and recreational crabbers.

Year

Trap"

Pot

Total

Dredge

---------------------1000 lbs-------------------1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

Unfortunately, little information is available on the
recreational crab fishery. Unlike recreational finfishing
in Virginia, recreational crabbers are not required to
have a license unless they intend to use more than one
pot per crabber. It is, therefore, difficult to determine
the number of recreational crabbers in Virginia. Based
on a 1988 survey, the National Marine Fisheries
Service estimated that there were approximately
200,000 recreational crabbers over the age of I5
harvesting blue crabs in Virginia. It is quite likely that
there arc many more recreational crabbers than reported
by the National Marine Fisheries Service. Moreover,
there appears to be a growing number of individuals
that exploit blue crabs for pleasure and subsistence.

12.27
0.00
1.28
0.47
33.60
5.46
0.22
3.04
0.00
64.19
1.08
0.04
2.91
0.49
0.14

27717.6
32713.1
30225.6
19669.7
31003.9
29437.1
32681.5
28166.7
3 I708.2
36193.4
39798.0
38789.9
33987.0
301.8
28792.6

8880.7
8083.0
4461.6
6090.8
6123.8
6606.5
7106.0
9443.2
10294.5
7678.1
6292.5
10663.7
6569.6
8200.1
4770.5

36747.2
40849.4
34819.0
25760.9
37177.2
36055.1
39834.3
37691.4
42044.1
44027.4
46104.1
49463.7
40732.8
37527.0
33591.6

•Peeler pound trap.
Source of Data:Virginia Marine Resource Commission.
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Although the fishery is a single species fishery, there
arc several products landed. Hard crabs are marketed
by size and sex. Peelers and soft crabs are two other
product forms of Callinectes sapidus. Taking the
market chain one step up, there is the problem that what
is landed partly determines the processed product form.
For example, large crabs may be processed as jumbo
lump while smaller crabs may be converted to lump,
special meat, mixed meat, and cocktail claws; all of
which have different values in the market.

towards hard crabs. The hard crab fishery is the
apparent dominant source of fishing mortality. If we
examine landings of hard crabs over recent years, it
becomes relatively clear that the blue crab resource and
fishery are in trouble (Figure 3).
Table 2. Landings of Blue Crabs, 1986- I 992
Year

The fishery is, thus, a complex multiproduct fishery
with many different products. Multiproduct fisheries
are extremely difficult to manage for either
conservation or economic purposes. In the blue crab
f
fishery, regulations af ecting size and sex of crabs
landed will affect not only the harvesting sector but will
also substantially affect the economic returns of
processors and dealers.

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

The blue crab fishery is a year-round fishery. The
hard and soft crab fisheries, however, have known
seasonality in landings. Landings of hard crabs are
highest between June and September and during the
month of Dccernber when seasonal holiday demand is
high and the dredge fishery begins. Landings or
production of soft crabs are highest between May and
August which coincides with the availability of peeler
crabs.

Landings
Hard
Soft

Value
Hard
Soft·'

--1000 lbs--

---$1000--,

35527
33592
37096
43150
47840
44056
23348

949
562
113 I
1252
931
1337
519

9090
10055
11947
12288
1541 I
)()322
9073

J095
823
1670
2664
1745
1717
1394

asoft and peeler crab landings and value.
Source: Virginia Marine Resources Commision.

Hard crab landings appear to be the dominant source
of fishing mortality (Table 2). Detailed data on the
production and economic returns of soft-shell crab
shedding operations arc not available. There is an issue
of the accuracy of blue crab landings; industry
comments and results of a survey by Rhodes and
Shabman (1994) suggest that reported landings may
equal slightly more than one-third of the actual
landings.5 That is, reported landings are thought to be
in error (underestimated) either because of misreporting
or non-reporting of the apparent increasing basket trade
in which crabs are sold to buyers who typically do not
report landings.

Figure 3. Hard Blue Crab Landings,
Virginia, 1944-1992
70

Available data on Virginia landings suggest that
the first priority of management should be directed

0'-----�-----�----1945 19!IO 19515 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985

Year
5

Rhodes, and L. Shabman. 1994. Blue Crab Pot
Fishery: The Issues and Concerns. Virginia Sea
Grant Report No. 94-09.
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1992

Landings declined by more than 50% between 1990 and
1992 (47.8 vs. 23.3 million pounds). The landings data
may also rcnect a shift in marketing strategy by
watermen. It is believed that watermen increased their
direct marketing or sales of basket crabs and possibly
decreased their sales of crabs to picking houses. If this
is the case, it is quite possible that the reported decline
in crab landings is not at all indicative of the actual
trend in blue crab landings.

It is because of the open-access nature and common
property problem of fisheries that economists and
fishery researchers have suggested controlled-access
and privatization schemes. Controlled-access is usually
advocated because it offers a potential cap on overall
fishing effort and greatly facilitates state-required
monitoring of the resource, harvest levels, and industry.
Privatization or resolving the common-property
problem is typically advocated to promote economic
efficiency and net social benefits to society.

There also appears to be a possible predictable cycle
in landings. Landings of hard blue crabs appear to
dramatically decline every 16-18 years (Figure 3). In
the past, recovery of landings has usually been quite
rapid. In the current situation, the resource does not
appear to be rapidly recovering. It is not known
whether or not resource declines experienced in 1992,
1993, and1994 arc indicative of long-run patterns or
related to overfishing and environmental degradation.
The VMRC, however, has few control points for
improving resource levels (e.g., they cannot regulate
environmental and climatic conditions). The VMRC
must focus on regulating the fishery to manage the
resource.

Prior to considering controlled-access schemes and
more elaborate regulatory regimes, such as property
rights and privatization, in the blue crab fishery, we
first explore open-access regulations. This is necessary
to demonstrate that resource conservation goals could
be obtained without addressing the common-property
and open-access nature of the blue crab fishery.
Open-access Solutions
The state currently has an open-access fishery for the
pot fishery and a limited entry fishery for the dredge
fishery. There is, however, a delayed entry restriction
which requires potential entrants to wait two years
before they may enter the pot fishery. Regulation of the
fishery includes gear restrictions, time and day and
week limits, delayed entry, and size and sex
restrictions. None of these regulations address the root
problem of over-capitalization--too much effort directed
at harvesting blue crabs or excessive production costs.
Alternatively, open-access solutions do not address the
problem of wasteful exploitation of a resource.

Even in the absence of a resource problem, there is a
perceived economic problem. There is likely to be too
much effort or individuals in the fishery which causes
profits per operating unit and economic efficiency to
decline to unnecessarily low levels. Alternatively, less
effort would allow higher returns per operating unit and
increased benefits to the Commonwealth.
Reliable effort data, such as number of boats,
manpower, days at sea, boat characteristics, and trap or
pot days, arc not available. Pishery scientists have
suggested, however, that fishing effort is too high and
needs to be reduced to enhance resource recovery and
provide the maximum benefits to the state of Virginia.

It has long been advocated that in any fishery in
which entry is open to all, overfishing and serious
economic problems will eventually occur. The major
economic problem is dissipation or reduction of profit.
Technically, the problem is that revenues less costs less
a normal return to the operator become zero because
harvesting costs increase relative to revenues. This
situation is more commonly referred to as rent
dissipation.

The crab pot fishery, the major source of fishing
mortality, is an open-access, common property fishery.
There is also, however, a delayed entry restriction that
delays new entrants from entering the fishery for two
years. Under a conventional open-access regime,
anyone that wants to enter the fishery may do so. Thus,
as long as a proffr can be realized, entry will occur.
Under the common property condition, no one entity
owns the resource and its use is relatively free. Since
the cost of using the resource is free, exploiters will
tend to overharvest the resource (this is like an
employer not having to pay its employees).

In an open-access fishery, production and revenues
per individual decline while costs per unit of production
increase. Eventually, overall profit is zero and the
economic incentives to enter the fishery are diminished.
Alternatively, it is costing more to produce a given
level of fish than it should. Under the open-access
position, production is technically and economically
inefficient, and society is not receiving the maximum
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possible benefit from the resource. Moreover, some of
the resources being used to harvest fish could be better
employed elsewhere in the economy.

Quotas can also be modified for a variety of factors.
For example, quotas can be spread out over time such
as monthly or quarterly; a quarterly quota might allow
2,500,000 pounds of hard crabs per quarter. They can
be imposed on sex and size. In the blue crab fishery,
for example, a quota of 10,000,000 pounds of hard
crabs larger than 6.0 inches could be imposed.

If we think of a pie chart where the area of the pie
represents total profit or rent given a fixed number of
fishermen, we can easily see the effects of allowing
unrestricted entry (Pigure 4). As the number of
fishermen in the fishery increase, the slice of the profit
available to each fishermen becomes smaller.
Eventually, the number of entrants increases to such a
level that overall profit for the fishery becomes zero.
All possible profit or rent is dissipated.

To effectively achieve biological or resource
conservation goals, quotas must be closely monitored
and enforced. Managers must take care not to get into
the borrowing mode (allow some of next year's harvest
to be taken this year because the fishery has reached its
stated quota). The borrowing mode is quite typical of
quota-based management and is one major reason why
quotas fail to achieve biological and economic goals
and objectives of management. Also, quotas, when
borrowing is allowed, typically fail to improve resource
conditions.

Figure 4. Open-access and Dissipation of Profit
Percent of resource (profit) as
entry Into fishery doubles
12.5

12.5

12.5

12.5

Most important, however, is that quotas and open
access regulations fail to address the dissipation or loss
of rent and do not maximize benefits to society.
Quotas, in fact, typically worsen economic conditions
by increasing the cost of fishing per unit of time.
Quotas may also force too much product on the market
at one time which can depress prices received by
watermen. Quotas, unless substantially modified, offer
no opportunity for society to capture rents from the
fishery. In the case of the blue crab fishery, quotas
would likely force rent to zero and Virginia would be
unable to collect any rent from the fishery. In addition,
quotas tend to reduce the tax base since taxes are
imposed on earnings after expenses or profits.

12.5

12.5

The blue crab regulations for the pot fishery are
examples of typical open-access, common property
regulations. They can, if properly implemented,
address biological concerns; they can never, however,
resolve the economic problems. Other open-access
regulations include quotas, trip limits, number of days
allowed to fish per week, number of gear (pots) allowed
to fish, gear size or configuration (e.g., cull rings), crew
size limits, seasonal closures, sanctuaries, and area
restrictions. In the absence of regulations that control
access and grant property rights, the common-property,
open-access fishery will not provide maximum benefits
to society. Open-access regulations can, however, be
used to resolve resource problems.

Under quotas and open-access management, adverse
economic repercussions are usually not recognized until
it is too late to do something about the problems.
Simply, fishermen or boats enter a fishery as long as
profits can be earned. Fishermen continue harvesting
the resource until total cost equals total revenue. When
revenues equal cost, profit is zero, and there is no
economic incentive for new entrants. Unfortunately,
over-fishing also usually occurs, even before profit
becomes zero.
When total cost and total revenue are equal, there are
more watermen, vessels, and gear than arc necessary to
harvest a given level of fish. Harvest levels are in
excess of socially-desired levels. Production or
harvesting becomes inefficient since fishing effort is
redundant or unnecessarily high. Profit is zero and
society does not receive the maximum possible
benefits. The total cost of producing a given quantity

A quota is the most frequently used open-access
regulation to control fishing mortality and rebuild fish
stocks. Quotas typically restrict total annual landings
to some level consistent with biological objectives such
as maximi�,c the yield or weight per recruit or set
harvest levels equal to maximum sustainable yield.
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of fish is higher than necessary. The point at which
revenue equals cost is known as the open-access
equilibrium (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Open-access Equilibrium
Long-run
sustainable

Open-access
equlllbrlum
profit= 0.0

EI

E ,m Fishing Effort E o,

must include limited entry or controlled access. That is,
the number of vessels, gear, and manpower must be
restricted in an open-access fishery to prevent
overharvesting and inefficient production.
Referring to Figure 5, the open-access equilibrium
level of effort is E0A; profit or rent for the open-access
fishery is zero (total revenue minus total cost = E - E =
0). The same levels of catch and revenue can be
obtained, however, with E 1 (E 1 < E0A) units of effort.
More important, profit or rent equal to A - B is
obtainable with E 1 units of fishing effort. More profit,
though, can be obtained by finding the level of effort
and catch associated with maximum profit. The
maximum profit level of effort is EMEY• and profit
equals C - D. The maximum profit equilibrium
corresponds to maximum social benefits and is called
the maximum economic yield (MEY).
As such, limited entry and controlled access schemes
are economic forms of management. Controlled-access
regulatory stra(egies seek to redistribute income and
promote economic efficiency. As previously stated,
limited entry and controlled-access are not necessary to
realize biological goals of resource management.
Unfortunately, there are numerous problems with
limited entry. First, what is the necessary level of
participants in the fishery? Second, what should be the
configuration of the industry (e.g., boat size, gear type,
hull construct:on, engine type, horsepower, many small
boats with small crew, or few large boats with large
crew)? Third, who stays and who leaves and what are
the criteria for remaining? What other regulations will
also be necessary to achieve biological, social,
economic, and legal goals of management?

In general, open-access regulations can be classified
by whether or not they control outputs or inputs. A
quota is an output control and a limit on the number of
fishing days is an input control. In the absence of
controlled-access, output and input controls will seldom
accomplish economic goals and objectives of resource
management. fishermen will tend to substitute
unregulated inputs for regulated factors of production.
For example, a restriction on the number of pots
allowed per fishermen might cause fishermen to
increase the number of days they fish with pots or to
install more powerful winches so they can pull the pots
faster. In the case of output controls, particularly
annual or seasonal quotas on the industry, fishermen
will "race" to harvest the quota before the fishery is
closed. ln so doing, profit is typically driven to zero or
very low levels.

Most fisheries, and which appears to be the case for
the blue crab fishery, are already severely over
capitalized. What additional regulations will be
necessary to reduce effective effort in the Virginia blue
crab fishery? Moreover, what information is available
to establish rational regulations for the fishery?
One major problem with limited entry that has been
recognized by researchers is that fishermen will engage
in "capital-stuffing." In the case of the blue crab
fishery, a limited entry scheme would likely result in
watermen increasil1g the number of pots, purchasing
larger boats or engines, or adding additional equipment
that allowed pots to be more efficiently fished. The total
costs of production or harvesting blue crabs would
eventually increase; as a consequence, profits would
decline.

Limited Entry Solutions
Commencing in 191 I with Jens Warming's work "On
rent on fishing grounds," economists and fishery
administrators have argued that fishery management
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In nearly every fishery throughout the world in which
limited entry has been implemented, capital stufling has
occurred and effective effort has not been adequately
controlled.

and restaurants would be affected by an extremely
restrictive harvest quota. A restrictive quota or
moratorium would, however, minimize the time it takes
to restore the resource.

Another problem that often accompanies limited entry
is a rush of applicants to enter the fishery. This
typically occurs before limited entry is actually
implemented or during the planning stages of a limited
entry program. When this occurs, the fishery typically
ends up with more boats and fishing power than prior
to the limited entry program. The bottom line is that
profit is driven towards zero and society does not
realize maximum benefits from the fishery if limited
entry is the only regulation used to regulate a fishery.

We iterate that it is important to understand that
limited entry is primarily an economic regulatory tool.
Referring back to the pie chart in Figure 4 and
assuming we have a crab fishery with only 4 watermen,
we can assess how profit declines as the number of
watermen increases. As the number of participants
increases, assuming all participants are homogeneous
and operating at maximum capacity, the slice per
watermen diminishes. As long as profits can be
realized, people will enter the fishery. Eventually, the
number of entrants drives profit to zero or very low
levels for the inefficient operators. At this point, entry
stops. More important, society does not realize
maximum benefits from the resource. There are more
fishermen and vessels than are actually necessary to
harvest a given level of crabs.

Taxing output is another form of limited entry. Taxes
are to be set at such a level that the least efficient
operators are driven out of the fishery. Unfortunately,
a tax program requires considerable monitoring of
resource and economic conditions. Taxes must
frequently be changed in order to maximize benefits.
Taxes do, however, offer Virginia an opportunity to
collect needed revenue. Unfortunately, it appears that
taxing outputs actually forces fishermen to increase
their fishing effort and subsequent harvest, at least in
the short to intermediate run. Boat owners typically
have large fixed costs which they must cover. Taxes
lower their revenue and leave them no choice but to try
to increase output and revenue.
It is important to realize that limited entry may not
solve the resource problem. The use of limited entry to
solve the resource problem depends upon how limited
entry is implemented and other regulations imposed on
the fishery. If Virginia adopts the conventional
procedures used to limit entry in which nearly all boats
currently in the fishery arc allowed to remain, and
imposes no other regulations, total nominal effort will
remain constant or increase, and total effective effort
will likely increase as producers engage in capital
stuffing.

An alternative to just limited entry is to combine
limited entry with other regulations. In the crab fishery,
for example, a limited entry scheme might be combined
with a restriction on the number of pots an individual
may be allowed to fish. There may also be restrictions
on areas and times of year when fishermen are allowed
to fish, or on gear. It has been shown, however, that
under limited entry schemes, it is often necessary to
eventually regulate every aspect of fishing power or
factor responsible for catching fish to avoid capital
stuffing. Failure to do so usually does not prevent the
dissipation of profit and loss of potential benefits to
society.
Implementing a limited entry program for the blue
crab fishery will likely be very difficult. The optimum
fleet size and configuration is unknown. A target level
of fishing mortality or total harvest has not been set. lt
is unknown how watermen might change their fishing
power in response to a limited entry program. It is
likely that a limited entry scheme for blue crabs will
have to eventually regulate all components of fishing
power. A limited entry program also does not ensure
that the citizens of Virginia will receive the maximum
benefits from the resource. Last, limited entry schemes
are usually ineffective at controlling mortality and
generating benefits for species, such as the blue crab,
that are short-lived and subject to large changes in
abundance caused by environmental factors.

There are many other, actually better, ways to restore
the resource. For example, a very restrictive limit
(small quota) on harvesting for 1-3 years should, at
least, theoretically increase resource levels. A low
quota would be a draconian measure in that there would
be severe economic hardships imposed on watermen
who make a living harvesting crabs. In addition,
processors, dealers, wholesalers, financial institutions,
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Individual Transferable Fishing Effort (ITEs)

after some initial allocation, arc owned by individuals.
Holders of ITQs can loan, sell, barter, rent, or give their
ITQs to whomever they want. The ITQ program, while
usually limiting the number of participants, conveys
some notion of ownership of the resource (i.e., conveys
imperfect property rights). An ITQ only guarantees
access or the opportunity to harvest a given output
level, or in the case of the blue crab fishery, a set
number of crnbs or baskets of crabs.

An interesting alternative to limited entry is individual
transferable effort (ITE). An ITE program can be
designed that limits the number of participants while
allowing f1cxibility to watermen to harvest blue crabs.
If necessary, an ITE program can also incorporate other
regulations (e.g., cull rings, area closures, and seasonal
restrictions). An ITE program can also be coupled with
a limited entry scheme.

Under an ITQ program, the problem of profit or rent
dissipation typically disappears. Producers now have
to pay for the use of the fish stock which was
previously free. Nearly every nation of the world with
commercial fisheries is currently implementing or
exploring ITQ-based management.

Under an ITE program, watermen could be initially
allocated a fixed number of fishing days, pot days, or
number of pots per year which were consistent with
some specified optimum yield. After the initial
allocation, holders of ITEs could barter, trade, rent, or
sell their ITEs to other watermen. Thus, an ITE regime
allows the total effort to be limited while allowing
opportunities to improve economic efficiency and
returns to watermen.

In the United States, the surf' clam and ocean quahog
fisheries are managed by ITQs. The South-Atlantic
wrcckfish fishery is also managed by ITQs. A great
lakes fishery of Wisconsin and the herring roe fishery
of California have a long-history of ITQ management.
ITQs are being considered for the west coast sablefish
and halibut fisheries. The southern bluefin tuna fishery
of Australia is managed by ITQs. ITQs are used to
manage 23 Canadian fisheries. South Africa manages
its highly valuable abalone fishery by ITQs. The
National Marine Fisheries Service issued studies on
using ITQs to manage and regulate the northwest
Atlantic sea scallop fishery, the Atlantic and king
mackerel fisheries, the Gulf shrimp fishery, and the
Pacific northwest groundfish fishery.

Implementing an !TE program for blue crabs may be
quite difficult. First, data on fishing effort arc limited.
Second, there docs not appear to be an apparent
relationship between fishing mortality and fishing
effort. Effort and catch per unit effort (CPUE) appear
to be uncorrelated; moreover, there are no estimates of
fishing mortality. Third, fishing operations arc quite
heterogeneous, and thus, it would be extremely difficult
to determine the level of effective fishing effort
necessary to achieve a stated OY. Alternatively, it
would be difficult to standardize fishing effort to reflect
the heterogeneity of fishing operations (e.g., how many
small boat days would be equivalent in fishing power to
one large boat day). Fourth, the number of pots or gear
n:strictions would still be necessary under an ITE
program. Last, the compliance, monitoring, and
enforcement costs of an !TE program would likely be
quite high. For example, watermen might have to
install transponders or a vessel tracking system (VTS)
to allow VMRC to monitor fishing activities, and
VMRC might have to adopt a:1 expensive monitoring
and enforcement program.

To date, there has been only a limited analysis of the
benefits of ITQs. In the southern bluclin tuna fishery of
Australia, ITQs were responsible for reducing fleet size
by more than 80%. Profits or net returns, however,
increased by more than $1 1 .0 million (Australian
dollars). Fewer, but larger, fish were being harvested.
The downward trend in parental biomass reversed its
long-run trend. Boat crews earned substantially more
income. Rents or monies received from the fishermen
under the ITQ regulation paid for 44% of management,
research, and related stock assessment work; prior to
ITQs, the fishermen paid nothing towards resource
management.

Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs)
Another type of controlled-access is the stock
certificate program or what has become known as the
individual transferable quota (ITQ). In actuality, an
ITQ is not really the same as limited entry. It can,
however, be implemented with a restriction on the
number of participants. Under an ITQ program, quotas
or shares,

The obvious appeal of lTQs is their seemingly
simplicity. Once the procedures for the initial
allocation and denomination of tradeable units are
determined, ITQs arc relatively easy to implement.
There are, unfortunately, some downsides or problems
of ITQs.
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First, ITQ-bascd management is, in practice, a
biomass approach. That is, ITQs seek to reduce total
landings or a given resource. They can be modified to
reflect size and sex of fish but this adds to the
complexity of management. ITQs also tend at least to
offer the potential for market power. This latter
problem would probably not happen in the blue crab
fishery given the large number of small operators.
Alternatively, an ITQ scheme could be designed that
prohibits any individual from gaining market
concentration power.

The first objective, maximize economic opportunities,
is a typical objective of less developed countries
(LDCs) and coastal communities. The concern in
LDCs is to create employment opportunities, provide
food and income or subsistence, expand the tax base,
a1:d generate foreign currency. The concerns of
Virginia coastal communities arc similar except for
subsistence and generating foreign cuncncy. Under the
objective of maximization of economic opportunities,
fisheries management focuses on short-run econolllic
growth.

ITQs usually arc inadequate, alone, for addressing the
multiproduct or multi-species nature of most fisheries.
That is, it is extremely difficult to deal with the multiple
product interactions. In the blue crab fishery, an ITQ
program would have to address size, sex, product form
(hard vs. soft crabs vs peelers), geographic location,
time of year, and gear type. ITQs, however, may be
easier to use to control multiproduct interactions and
fisheries exploited by different types of gear than other
types of regulatory strategies.

Most growth-based policies focus on subsistence and
capital availability policies. Policies that focus on
subsistence or capital available typically involve
training individuals to harvest fishery resources and
lllaking low-cost loans available.
Except for
underutilized species, growth-based fisheries arc short
lived. Over-capitalization, excess fishing effort, and
overharvesting usually occur. Society docs not receive
maximum benefits and profits are quickly dissipated.
Another interesting aspect of the growth-based fishery
is that they usually do not generate the greatest tax
base. This is particularly true for U.S. fisheries. As the
number of participants increase, profit declines. As
profit declines, the tax-base or net income subject to
taxation declines.

Differences in size, sex, and product form typically
cause a problem known as "high-grading" in ITQ
management. Fishermen discard the lower valued
products to retain more of the higher valued products;
if discard mortality is zero, "high-grading" is not a
problem. If discard mortality is nonzero, however,
"high-grading" can pose major problems for the
resource; the large and more fecund female animals
usually command the highest prices in the market.
Discard mortality for the blue crab pot fishery is likely
to be near zero or extremely low since unwanted crabs
arc readily culled and returned, generally unham1ed, to
the environment. Discard mortality in the dredge
fishery, however, may be high. Overall, high-grading
would not be expected to cause a serious problem for
the blue crab fishery .

Consider the tax base for the hard L;t � crab fishery.
Total revenue in 1992 was $9.1 million. The tax base
would be equal to total profit or total revenue less total
cost. Given a constant revenue of $9.1 million, total
profit and earnings subject to taxation would be smaller
for a large number of watermen than it would be for a
few highly-efficient watermen. With a lot of fishing
firms and a finite resource, cost per unit of output and
per operating unit would be higher than with fewer
fishing firms. These conclusions, however, assume that
the fishery was overcapitalized in 1992.

Potential Regulatory Strategy for Blue Crabs

The economic growth strategy, by and large, no
longer characterizes resource managelllent in the United
States. Fisheries management often has, however,
focused on economic maintenance. This appears to be
the case for management of blue crabs as well as many
other U.S. fisheries.

Although the state does not have well defined or
specified objectives for managing Cal/inectes sapiclus,
it is reasonable to consider two possibly competing
objectives of resource management. First, the state
may want to maximize economic opportunities.
Second, the state may desire to maximize net economic
benefits to the citizens of the Commonwealth. Although
a cumbersome concept, maximization of net benefits to
the Commonwealth would ensure that all and non users
of the crab resource would receive maximum benefit
from resource management. Alternatively, the dollar
value of the resource assessed by society after
deducting all costs would be as large as possible.

In this case, the management agency attempts to
maintain the status quo in terms of number of
participants and economic opportunities.
The
management agency may alternatively desire to
maximize the number of allowable harvesters.
Unfortunately, the status quo for most fisheries, and
possibly the blue crab fishery, is incompatible with
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resource levels. Thus, we find that even for the status
quo strategy, the resource may be ovcrharvcsted and
potential profits arc not maximized. At a minimum, it
is likely that there arc too many watermen and fishing
boats exploiting the blue crab resource, and as a
consequence, the cost per unit of production is likely to
be unnecessarily high.

fishery and the TAC was 40,000,000 pounds, the state
could implement a transactions fee of $0.25 per I 00
pounds of ITQ.
The ITQ scheme could also be modified to allow the
state to buy and sell quota every year or every season to
control the rate of resource removal. If the TAC was
higher than the initial allocation, the state could sell
ITQs; when the TAC was lower than the initial
allocation, the state could buy quota. Monies realized
from the transactions fee and subsequent sales of quota
could be used by the state to purchase quota and
manage the resource.

Managing the fishery to sustain the maximum
allowable number of harvesters, as is under
consideration by Maryland, is also a regulatory strategy
that is not likely to enhance resource and economic
conditions. This type of objective is void of any type of
economic optimum other than ensuring employment
opportunities. It requires determining the configuration
of the fishing fleet and gear. To satisfy this objective,
management must design regulations that impose
extreme inefficiency. An example of an inefficient
operation would be a 14 foot boat powered by sail in
which the operator could fish only one pot per day.
This operation would allow a large number of
harvesters but their earnings would likely be very low.

Historically, the initial allocation of ITQs has been
based on historical participation in the fishery.
Transactions fees are usually zero. The Mid-Atlantic
Fisheries Management Council, however, is
considering imposing a user fee for surf clams, ocean
quahogs, and other species. Under an initial allocation
framework, the management agency simply assigns
shares to the vessel owners and allows market
transactions to deal with the buying and selling or
trading of quota in the future. ITQ schemes in New
Zealand and Australia appear to be the only ones that
impose a transactions fee or require holders of quota to
pay a fee to the nation.

Alternatively, sustaining the maximum number of
harvesters could be based on economic criteria. This
would require, however, the management authority to
determine income levels for fishermen and the optimum
fleet size and configuration. For example, regulations
would allow fishermen, on average and year after year,
to earn a fixed amount of income. This type of
regulation would likely be rejected by watermen and
would do little to enhance the economic benefits of the
crab resource.

Of all the possible regulatory schemes for blue crabs,
the individual transferable quota is likely the most
promising if the state desires to generate revenues,
promote resource conservation, and convey maximum
benefits to the Commonwealth. Implementing an ITQ
program, however, is likely to be quite difficult.

If the state should elect to manage the blue crab
fishery for the purpose of economic opportunity or
status quo, the state will not receive the maximum
economic benefit, and quite likely, not the maximum
tax revenue from blue crab harvesting. In essence, if
the state desires to maximize short-run employment or
limited economic opportunities, continuing previous
forms of open-access will likely suffice. It will be
necessary, however, to better define the optimum yield
to ensure some long or intermediate-run stability in the
resource.

If the state decides to initiate an ITQ program to
manage the blue crab fishery, a variety of issues will
have to be addressed. First, will the ITQs be issued
relative to product form or just simply with respect to
total blue crabs (e.g., an ITQ for hard blue crabs, an
ITQ for peelers, and an ITQ for soft-shelled crabs).
The preferred approach is to issue an ITQ for total
production but only after setting the ITQ relative to
long-run biological and economic goals and objectives.
In this manner, watermen can decide how to allocate
their effort and max1m1ze their net returns.
Alternatively, watermen have maximum flexibility in
deciding on a fishing strategy. A total ITQ strategy
also creates the opportunity for the state to maximize
tax collections and revenues from the fishery.

On the other hand, if the state desires to maximize net
benefits from the fishery, individual transferable quotas
(ITQs) offer the most promise. Under this regime, the
state could auction off the first-round allocation and
receive income. Alternatively, the state could allocate
the initial total allowable catch (TAC) based on
historical participation but implement a transactions fee
equal to the cost of managing the blue crab resource.
For example, if it cost Virginia $100,000 to manage the

lTQs by gear and resource area also could be
implemented if managers are concerned about equity
and temporal problems. Again, however, it is
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preferable that the harvester be allowed to adopt the
most efficient gear and exploit the areas yielding
maximum economic returns; this could likely occur
f
with an ITQ regime structured to deal with dif erences
in resource area and gear.

be available in easily tradcable denominations. Should
ITQs be issued in percentage of total allowable catch
(TAC) or actual harvest units such as pounds and
baskets? Harvest units appear to be the most common
denomination for ITQs.

In general, ITQs work best in small fisheries in which
the species is long-lived, slow growing, and not subject
to large random fluctuations in abundance. The blue
crab is short-lived, fast growing, and probably subject
to large random fluctuations in abundance. An annual
total allowable catch (TAC) may, thus, be difficult to
set at the beginning of each harvesting season. This
problem can be partly mitigated, however, by imposing
a minimum TAC regardless of the current conditions of
the resource; the TAC can be adjusted, only upwards.
during the season as new information becomes
available.

What Arc Some Likely Problems of ITQs?

There are three primary problems the state must
address in an ITQ program for blue crabs: (I)
transactions fee, user fee, or tax, (2) the setting of an
annual total allowable catch (TAC), and (3) whether or
not to establish a centralized market, or at least,
electronic access to daily market prices for quota. The
three problems arc not trivial and all involve increased
costs for the state. The costs, however, should be easily
recoverable via revenue collection activities (e.g., user
fee).

Another potential problem with ITQs is market
concentration or market power. Although illegal, ITQs
create the opportunity for buyers to collude and
purchase large quantities of quota and subsequently
control the market. It is unknown whether or not there
is an opportunity for buyers and sellers to control the
market. It is unlikely that a group of watermen could
dominate the market since there are many watermen.
Processors or owners of picking houses, however, may
have sufficient buying power to collude, and thereby,
control the exploitation of the resource. This possibility
needs to be thoroughly examined when considering
ITQ management.

A Remaining Option--Thc lluy llack

There is growing interest by resource managers in
reducing fleet size--number of vessels--via a buy back
scheme. Under this scheme, vessels arc purchased by
the state or federal government. In New Zealand, the
ITQ program was coupled with a buy back program.
Unfortunately, the buy back program funds became
depleted, and the management agency was unable to
purchase the number of vessels necessary to achieve
maximum net social benefits.

The United States agency, National Marine Fisheries
Service, is currently investigating a buy back program
for New England fisheries. The desire is to reduce the
fleet size by approximately 60-70 c7o. It remains
unknown whether or not an ITQ scheme will be
coupled with the potential buy back program.

A potentially serious problem with ITQs in the crab
fishery is the need to establish a floor level of TAC and
harvest rights to the individual harvester. If there is any
possibility that TAC might be set to zero in a given
year, watermen will have extreme difficulty in
borrowing funds to operate their businesses. Financial
institutions simply will not make loans to a business
entity in which production might be constrained to zero.

There are several problems with a buy back program.
First, there is the problem of which boats should be
targeted to be purchased. Second, how is the purchase
price to be determined? Third, the buy back program
must be coupled with some other regulatory strategies
preferably an ITQ scheme, to promote maximum
economic benefits. Fourth, how is the buy back
program to be financed? Last, there may be so many
boats in the blue crab fishery, it simply may not be
economically feasible to consider a buy back program.

ITQs also require increased monitoring and
enforcement. Thus, the state could find that managing
the blue crab fishery under an ITQ program could
increase their management and regulatory costs. This
is currently the situation in the surf clam/ocean quahog
fishery. The recent stock assessment suggests that the
TAC or annual fleet quota must be reduced. Industry
has countered, however, that the assessment is flawed.
The National Marine Fisheries Service must now redo
its assessment for surf clams and ocean quahogs.

Conclusions

The blue crab fishery of Virginia is thought to be
important to several coastal economics; its actual
importance is not known, though, because of
inadequate information. The Virginia Institute of

Another problem with ITQs is establishing the
denominations of ITQs. Just like money, ITQs have to
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Marine Science, however, is currently conducting a
study to determine the economic importance of
Virginia's commercial fisheries. The blue crab fishery
has become increasingly important over the past few
years as other marine resources have declined in
abundance and experienced downward shifts in demand
while the worldwide demand for crab meat and related
products has substantially increased. For example,
watermen previously dependent on oysters for a
plurality of income now increasingly depend on crabs.

considered. Overharvesting or maximum exploitation
has occurred in nearly every fishery managed under
MFCMA in which the objective was economic growth
or maintenance of the fishery or industry.
Allowing a common-property, open-access strategy to
continue will not allow the c111zens of the
Commonwealth to receive maximum benefits from the
blue crab resource. A common-property, open-access
strategy, however, will offer maximum employment
opportunities in the short-run when resource conditions
are relatively high. In the long-run, the open-access
fishery will cause some type of biological overfishing,
loss of profit, and zero or near-zero growth
opportunities. A case in point is the New England
groundfish fishery. Since 1977, the number of vessels
and crew substantially increased. The fishery has
historically been an open-access fishery. Today, the
New England Fishery Management Council is having
to deal with a moratorium on fishing for cod, haddock,
yellowtail founder, pollack, and redfish (ocean perch).
If the blue crab resource is really declining as suggested
by the scientific community, VMRC may have to
consider the option of drastically limiting the harvesting
of blue crabs in the near future.

It i� believed by research scientists and resource
managers that effort has increased to the point that the
short-run and possibly long-run viability of the resource
is in jeopardy. As a consequence, fishery researchers
and some administrators have suggested that VMRC
explore alternative regulations, and in particular,
limited entry and effort control schemes.
It is important to recognize that while limited entry
programs can reduce the overall level of effort and aid
in resource restoration, limited entry docs not offer the
best approach for quickly restoring the resource. One
possible approach for restoring the resource in the
minimum amount of time is to drastically restrict the
taking and harvesting of blue crabs. While this strategy
would minimize the time it takes the resource to
rebuild, it would also cause severe economic hardships
for watermen, coastal communities, and businesses
dependent upon the blue crab fishery. In addition, there
is no guarantee that restrictive harvest policies will
rebuild the resource.

Limited entry is not a cure-all for the blue crab
fishery. Other restrictions, such as cull rings and the
number of pots per individual, will be necessary.
Alternatively, limited entry will not necessarily limit
total effective fishing effort and prevent the biological
and economic waste that potentially occurs with
overharvesting adult crabs and the harvesting of small
or lean crabs. It will be necessary to consider
regulations that also control the age-at-entry and total
effective effort.

There arc simply too many unknowns in the rebuilding
equation. These unknowns include environmental
factors, food availability, predation, and water quality.
All, except water quality, arc generally uncontrollable.

or the many potential regulatory strategics to solve
the resource and economic problems, ITQs likely offer
the most promise for the blue crab fishery. Admittedly,
the fishery is not an ideal candidate for ITQs, but
neither have been many of the fisheries of the world
that have been successfully managed by ITQs.
Moreover, many of the potential problems with ITQs
for the blue crab fishery could be resolved by imposing
a minimum annual TAC. Supplementary regulations,
however, might also be required with ITQ management
of the fishery (e.g., cull ring size or restrictions on
dredges to ensure a reduction in dredge-related
mortality). ITQs also may have to be designed
explicitly recognizing the multiproduct nature of the
fishery; the multiproduct nature, however, should be of
concern regardless of the form of management. Also,
ITQs likely offer the best management strategy for
dealing with multiple products because they allow

Before controlled-access, private property regimes, or
open-access regulations can be successfully evaluated,
the state of Virginia and the VMRC must determine the
objectives of managing the r(!sourcc. Docs VMRC
want to focus primarily on resource conservation or on
the benefits to the Commonwealth? Alternatively, docs
VMRC want to maximize the long-run benefits of the
resource which requires joint consideration of resource
conservation and economic benefits?
In comparison, federal fisheries management, under
the Magnusom Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA), is currently focusing on
managing fisheries to maximize benefits to society. To
do so, however, requires a bio-economic management
framework in which the population dynamics and
economic benefits arc interrelated and jointly
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watermen flexibility in deciding how and what to
produce.
Primary problems of ITQs for the state will be
deciding the initial allocation and denomination of
ITQs and whether or not to implement user-fees.
Another problem for the state will be determining total
allowable catches (TACs) each year; VMRC will have
to determine if it has the capability to set TAC to levels
consistent with resource conditions. Last, VMRC will
have to decide whether or not there should be a
minimum annual TAC to allow watermen and crab
related businesses to obtain loans from financial
institutions.
An ITQ program will require additional investment by
the state for data collection and fishery monitoring
activities; additional expenditures would be required,
however, for any regulatory strategy concerned with
maximizing benefits to the Commonwealth. If an ITQ
program is to be successful, accurate assessments of
resource conditions are essential. Accurate assessments
of blue crab abundance, however, may be difficult since
there is likely to be a high degree of variability in
resource abundance and the relationship between
spawning stock and recruitment. Moreover, monitoring
of landings and harvesting activities are required for
any successful ITQ program just as they are for any
successful regulatory regime.
Inevitably, there will be some type of market for
ITQs. Whether or not the market will be comprised of
many buyers and sellers having little information about
ITQ prices or a centralized market in which all buyers
and sellers have access to ITQ price information will
depend upon decisions made by the state. That is, the
state will have to decide whether or not to invest in
creating a centralized market. Thus far, none of the
U.S. fisheries managed under ITQs have a centralized
market or electronic bulletin board for disseminating
information about ITQ prices. It has been shown in
other ITQ programs and in the case of marketable
emission or pollution permits for electric power plants,
however, that if an ITQ program is to be successful,
there must be some sort of centralized market or
electronic bulletin board that summarizes ITQ prices.
In the absence of a centralized exchange or electronic
posting system, it is unlikely that market equilibrium
prices for ITQs will form, and as a consequence,
maximum economic efficiency and social and
economic benefits may not be realized.
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